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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.  That to secure these 
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed, That 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish 
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on 
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to 
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and 
Happiness.1  
In 1786, a group composed of ex-military and farmers 
sought to take over the seat of government in Massachusetts in a 
coup later known as Shays’s Rebellion.2  This distressing event 
occurred because the people in rural areas of Massachusetts felt 
that they were not properly represented by the “elites” in more 
densely populated areas.3  Before that group, small, radical groups 
of Colonists led a rebellion against Britain’s vast empire for 
mainly the same reasons.4  The phrase “no taxation without 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022.  Articles Editor of the 
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022.  The author extends thanks to the faculty and staff of the 
University of Arkansas, specifically Professor Mark Killenbeck, as well as to the Arkansas 
Law Review.  Additionally, the author extends thanks to God for making this Comment 
possible, and to all those who vehemently disagree with each other - sharpening arguments 
and propagating the sport of critical debate. 
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
2. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S 
FINAL BATTLE 4, 6, 18 (2003). 
3. Id. at 6.  
4. See RAY RAPHAEL, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HOW 
COMMON PEOPLE SHAPED THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE 5, 14-17 (Howard Zinn ed., The 
New Press rev. ed. 2016).  See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 
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representation” is undoubtedly an idiomatic motif of the 
Colonists’ purpose.5  This quaint but markedly gruesome 
rebellion later became known as the American Revolution.6  After 
both events had come and gone, the victors took measures to 
ensure appropriate representation for their constituents.7  
Likewise, both incidents required radical changes to their 
respective structures of government.  Given that Americans have 
always gone to great lengths to seek adequate representation, it is 
unsurprising that the national popular vote movement exists.  
That being said, this Comment aims to prove why the 
national popular vote—and in particular the iteration referred to 
as the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is 
unconstitutional, ineffective, and potentially disastrous.  While 
there has been much scholarly debate about the validity of a 
national popular vote interstate compact, many works have 
focused only on the Compact Clause requirements.  The articles 
that have shifted focus away from the compact aspect of the 
popular vote system either fail to incorporate the Compact Clause 
materials at all or do not have the benefit of new Supreme Court 
decisions outlining the States’ near plenary power to control their 
electors.   
This Comment aims to provide a holistic picture of the 
NPVIC and any closely related compacts through updated 
precedent.  This Comment will first look at what a national 
popular vote might entail and explicitly lays out the most 
prominent popular vote movement, the NPVIC.  This Comment 
will then focus on the NPVIC’s Compact Clause element to 
determine whether congressional approval is required before this 
compact can go into effect.  Next, this Comment will address the 
 
1776) (saying one justification for the revolution was the deterioration of “the right of 
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants 
only”).  
5. See, e.g., RAPHAEL, supra note 4, at 16-17 (saying the American Revolution did not 
spawn from mere class warfare and was in fact instigated in part by “[m]any merchants, 
lawyers, and other colonists of comfortable means object[ing] only to the abuse of power by 
the British Parliament”). 
6. See id. at 24 (saying the lead up to the American Revolution was carried out by 
small, unorganized movements, not a heroic call to arms by any founding father). 
7. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2; see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 1. 
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potential legal challenges to the NPVIC that would exist despite 
congressional approval.  In discussing that post-approval claim, 
the potential procedural bars to a case against the NPVIC will be 
addressed, then the substantive challenges of any potential case.8  
Finally, this Comment will close on the national popular vote 
movement’s purpose and some healthy alternatives to safely and 
practically reach that same goal.  In conclusion, this Comment 
will advocate one alternative above the rest for its constitutional 
consistency, compliance with social reformation demands, and 
structural integrity.  
I.  DEFINING A NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 
In determining a national popular vote’s constitutionality, it 
is necessary to first define, in a concise manner, what a national 
popular vote is.  Luckily, since 2006, many States have proposed 
and adopted a uniform interstate compact, the NPVIC, to achieve 
that very thing.9  While none of the NPVIC statutes have gone 
into effect as of this Comment’s writing, their activation has been 
looming year after year and will do so in perpetuity.10  This 
perpetual possibility stems from the fact that, once adopted, there 
is no action necessary except to wait for the triggering event—the 
addition of more member States.11  As a result, States that have 
already adopted the NPVIC can renew this measure without end 
and with an unlimited time to garner support.12  This Comment 
will focus on the NPVIC alone because it appears to have the most 
wind beneath its wings, compared to other national popular vote 
proposals.13  After the 2016 presidential election, the NPVIC 
 
8. The substantive challenges will be predicated on the plain text of the Constitution, 
the thoughts and opinions of the founding fathers during the convention, and the current 
social and political arguments against a national popular vote and the NPVIC specifically. 
9. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NPV—THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 
INITIATIVE: PROPOSING DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT THROUGH AN INTERSTATE 
COMPACT 2 (2019). 
10. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, 
[https://perma.cc/MM4U-PDEQ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
11. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1. 
12. See id. 
13. Eric T. Tollar & Spencer H. Kimball, A More Perfect Electoral College: 
Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions Under the Twelfth Amendment, 9 LEGIS. & POL’Y 
BRIEF 4, 28 (2020). 
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found renewed support, which generated the most positive 
movement towards a national popular vote since the idea’s 
inception.14  That being said, this Comment’s analysis and 
conclusions can be extended to any similar proposal so long as no 
material changes have occurred.  After reviewing other proposals, 
it appears the general principles of a national popular vote system 
remain more or less unchanged in any iteration of the proposal.15  
So, what system does the NPVIC set out?  First and most 
critically, it will, as the name implies, nationalize the election 
processes of member States.16  In other words, it will eradicate 
any distinction between State lines when determining which 
candidate the State electors should vote for.  Upon the first 
presidential election’s occurrence after the compact goes into 
effect, the NPVIC would instead instruct member States to 
conduct their statewide popular votes as they would absent the 
compact.17  The States would then add up each of the statewide 
popular votes, and the “chief election official” of each State 
would determine the nationwide popular vote’s outcome.18  At 
this point, the chief election official would submit the outcome of 
the national popular vote to the members of that State’s Electoral 
College.19  The electors would then cast their ballots, conforming 
to the national popular vote’s results, regardless of what results 
their State yielded.20  The “election official” designation belongs 
to either the State’s governor or the mayor in the District of 
Columbia.21  Coupled with the wording of some State statutes that 
bind electors to their party’s primary candidate, the NPVIC’s 
process would effectively restrict the electors to vote only for the 
candidate who won the nationwide popular vote.22 
 
14. Id.  
15. See, e.g., Ralph M. Goldman, Hubert Humphrey’s S. J. 152: A New Proposal for 
Electoral College Reform, 2 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 89, 90 (1958); H.R.J. Res. 109, 108th 
Cong. (2004).  
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019). 
17. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009). 
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
19. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
20. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01. 
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009). 
22. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying states have 
absolute control of their electors); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979) (voiding faithless 
votes); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 18002 (1994) (imposing a penalty for a faithless vote). 
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The NPVIC will take effect when a sufficient number of 
States join the compact.23  The number of federally delegated 
electoral votes each State has determines the number of necessary 
States.24  Before the compact can take effect, the total number of 
electoral votes collectively possessed by member States must 
equal 270 or more, so that this compact and its members alone 
can secure the presidential seat.25  As of this Comment’s writing, 
the NPVIC member States’ combined electoral votes equal 195, 
only 75 shy of their 270 goal.26  Despite the NPVIC’s adoption 
by more than a dozen States, it does not appear that this compact 
has been proffered for congressional approval.27  The following 
section will discuss why congressional approval is necessary, but 
not sufficient, for the compact to be effective in a constitutional 
manner.   
II.  WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD 
NEED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL 
The Compact Clause of the Constitution is found in Article 
I, Section 10, Clause 3.  The pertinent language in that mandate 
is as follows:  “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress 
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State 
. . . .”28  While this seems straightforward, the Supreme Court has 
varied significantly in determining what is required by this 
clause.29  The irony with this clause’s inconsistent treatment is 
that both accepted definitions are allegedly based on textualist 
interpretations of the Constitution.30  The broader of the two 
definitions would place a bar on any interstate agreement made 
without congressional consent, regardless of the nature of such 
agreement.31  Under this interpretation, the Court defines the 
 
23. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
24. OR. REV. STAT. § 248.355 (2001). 
25. See 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013). 
26. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, supra note 10. 
27. NEALE, supra note 9, at 2. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. 
29. Compare U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978) 
(defining “agreements” and “compacts” narrowly), with Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 
503, 519 (1893) (defining “agreements” and “compacts” broadly).  
30. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519. 
31. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 459.  
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terms “compact” and “agreement” as used in Article I, Section 10 
broadly and synonymously.32  This encompasses any activity that 
possibly interferes with the supremacy of the United States, and 
any activity that “the United States can have no possible objection 
[to] or have any interest in interfering with[.]”33   
This plain text meaning of the Compact Clause, as laid out 
above, was previously said to be invalid when read in context by 
the proponents of the narrower definition.34  While the Court did 
acknowledge that the two contrasting definitions were both 
predicated on the plain text of the Constitution, the first 
interpretation was nevertheless abandoned as the Court was 
reluctant to bar interstate agreements that “do not enhance state 
power to the detriment of federal supremacy.”35  In addition, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that Congress can implicitly 
approve of an interstate compact before it is fully furnished for 
any formal approval.36  The Court also stressed that there are 
some instances where the States must act before Congress can 
determine whether its approval will be granted or not.37  In sum, 
not every agreement entered into between States requires 
congressional approval.38  The Court even went as far as to say 
that some agreements did not need congressional approval at all 
because the historical practice of seeking congressional approval 
for like compacts was merely out of caution and convenience for 
the associated states, rather than to prevent injury to the 
supremacy of the United States.39  However, the Court did 
acknowledge that any negative impact to the supremacy of the 
United States was to be considered for its potential of and not 
actual injury.40   
 
32. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 520. 
33. Id. at 518. 
34. See id. at 519.  
35. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460. 
36. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 521 (finding that congressional approval may 
be implied in a number of ways including subsequent ratification and enforcement of the 
terms of a compact).  
37. See id. at 521.  
38. See id.  
39. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471.  
40. Id. at 472.  
3 BARNES.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:49 PM 
2021 THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 501 
 
While there has been some pushback over the years to this 
laissez-faire rule—allowing significant interstate dealings 
without congressional approval41—the most important pushback 
to this rule (regarding a national popular vote) was the 
acknowledgment that the interference with the supremacy of the 
United States was not the only matter for consideration.42  Instead, 
the Court recognized that an agreement would require 
congressional approval when such approval would guard against 
any potential adverse effect on any State not made a party to the 
agreement.43  If there is an agreement that has the potential to 
injure another State, it is the right and duty of Congress to provide 
approval before the agreement goes into effect.44  The Court 
eventually laid out four indicia that an agreement would be of the 
kind to require congressional approval due to its potential harm 
to another State.  These indicators are:  (1) the existence of a joint 
administrative body between the States, (2) the action of one 
member State being conditioned on the action of another member 
State, (3) the bar on any of the States to unilaterally and freely 
modify or repeal their acceptance of the agreement, and (4) the 
requirement of reciprocity in an agreement concerning limitations 
imposed on a member State’s inherent powers.45 
The general principles of the Compact Clause include 
possible interference with federal supremacy or a substantial 
impact on non-member States.46  As a result, congressional 
approval is required here regardless of the indicators’ existence, 
but that will be discussed later.47   
Assuming, arguendo, that further proof is needed to 
determine whether congressional approval is required, the above 
test, when applied to the compact at hand, is satisfied with three 
out of the four indicators being present.48  There does not appear 
 
41. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 372 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
42. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854). 
43. Id. 
44. Id.  
45. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 
(1985). 
46. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978); see also 
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 494. 
47. See infra Part II. 
48. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
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to be any indication that the NPVIC will adopt an administrative 
body; thus, the first indicator is likely not met.49  However, the 
rest of the indicators are blatantly present.  Getting the ball rolling, 
the NPVIC meets the second indicator, which essentially looks to 
“whether [the compact’s] effectiveness depends on the conduct of 
other members . . . .”50  This is met because the NPVIC will come 
into effect only after “states cumulatively possessing a majority 
of the electoral votes” have enacted this agreement.51  This means 
that every member State has only conditionally approved the 
compact, subject to action by other States.  
Additionally, how a State directs the panel of electors to cast 
their electoral votes would be predicated on conducting a popular 
vote in each of the other member States.52  Northeast Bancorp, 
Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Bancorp) involved multiple States drafting a similar statute in 
each jurisdiction, and there was evidence suggesting that the State 
legislatures drafted the statutes together.53  Nevertheless, the 
Bancorp Court found that no compact had been formed, let alone 
one that needed congressional approval.54  This was largely 
because while an incentive structure was designed to entice more 
States to adopt the similarly-worded statute, the document was 
more akin to a model law than an agreement between States.55  
In addition, the incentive structure found in that case was not 
a result of the proposed law itself, but rather the incentive 
originated from a federal law barring the interstate exchange of 
bank titles, absent a contrary State law permitting the transfer.56  
In essence, the law there was not reciprocal because the States 
 
49.  But see JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE BASED PLAN FOR 
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 278 (National Popular Vote Press, 
4th ed. 2013) (“These tasks could be simplified by the establishment of an administrative 
clearinghouse for these functions.  The officials of the compacting states might themselves 
establish such a clearinghouse.  Alternatively, such a clearinghouse might be established by 
federal law.”).  
50. Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015); see also COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4303A (2019); see also NEALE, supra note 9, at 1. 
52. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002; S.P. 252, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019).  
53. See 472 U.S. 159, 163-65, 173, 175 (1985). 
54. Id. at 175. 
55. See id. at 169.  
56. Id.  
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were merely working together to reap the full benefits of an 
enacted federal law.57  In that case, once one State adopted the 
statute it became valid and enforceable as to that State, 
independent from the actions of any other State.58  In short, the 
statute at issue in Bancorp is vastly different from the NPVIC.59   
To reiterate, the NPVIC requires other States to adopt the 
same law before it becomes effective.60  While there is no 
mandated adoption or forced incentive structure built into the 
NPVIC,61 there are other ramifications States may face if they do 
not play nice with the existing member States upon activation.62  
The States’ selection of electors is expressly conditioned on a 
popular vote in the other member States.63  In conclusion, the 
NPVIC’s conditional adoption clause and how the compact 
functions make its effectiveness conditioned on other member 
States’ actions.  
Next, when a compact cannot freely and unilaterally be 
repealed, that indicates the compact will likely need prior 
congressional approval.64  Customarily, a compact has the 
“distinguishing feature” of presumptively being interminable 
without the deliberate action of multiple member States and thus 
requires congressional approval.65  The presumption of this 
norm’s presence in compacts can only be overborne by “express 
provisions that permit withdrawal . . . .”66  In fact, express 
permission to leave a compact is so necessary that “[t]he absence 
of comparable language in the Compact is significant and weighs 
against” the ability of a State to freely and unilaterally repeal a 
compact.67  One State supreme court went as far as saying that not 
 
57. Id. at 164.  
58. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 472 U.S. at 175. 
59. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167A, § 2 (1996), with OR. REV. STAT. § 23.248 
(2019). 
60. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
61. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009).  
62. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 9882 (2003). 
63. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
64. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 
175 (1985).  
65. Waterfront Comm’n v. Murphy, 429 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.N.J. 2019), vacated, 961 
F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2020) (vacating order for lack of jurisdiction). 
66. Id. at 11.  
67. Id. (citing Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013)).  
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even the unequivocal ability to come and go as a State freely 
pleases (even when enumerated) is sufficiently dispositive of 
whether a compact would require congressional approval under 
this indicator.68  Instead, the court there looked to the statute’s 
history.69  
While the member States are free to repeal the NPVIC, they 
have a limited duration to repeal the statute.70  Otherwise, they 
will be bound by their initial pledge to appoint their electors based 
on the nationwide popular vote.71  If they intend their refutation 
to be effective, the member States must repeal the NPVIC before 
the last six months of a president’s term.72  This, while not an 
absolute bar on the repeal of the agreement, sufficiently impacts 
a State’s unilateral ability to withdraw.73  There is no language 
indicating that States can freely repeal or modify the statute at 
their discretion.74  Because the absence of express permission to 
freely and unilaterally repeal or modify a compact indicates the 
inability to do so,75 the NPVIC would presumptively not allow 
member States to leave or modify willingly.  In addition to the 
absence of such a provision, the express restriction on when a 
member State can effectively walk away76 sufficiently satisfies 
this indicator. 
Finally, and “[m]ost importantly,” when a compact requires 
reciprocal obligations or limits to inherent State powers, the 
compact will need congressional approval.77  This indicator 
essentially looks to whether the member State “ceded a portion of 
its own sovereignty in order to benefit from the collective action 
of multiple states . . . .”78  All member States to the NPVIC give 
up their ability to direct their electors to vote under that State’s 
 
68. Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015). 
69. Id. (finding “the history of the Compact is replete with examples of unilateral state 
action”).  
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
71. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
72. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
73. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1.  
74. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01. 
75. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013). 
76. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1. 
77. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 
(1985). 
78. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 880 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. 2016).  
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mandates.79  This ability is undoubtedly a part of a State’s 
sovereign power.80  The restriction of such sovereign power so 
that all member States may expand their combined strength is 
precisely the kind of reciprocal obligation this indicator 
requires.81  In sum, the most important indicator that a compact is 
of the kind that would require congressional approval also 
appears to be the most straightforward.  It is undeniable that any 
State that enters into the NPVIC limits its ability to “appoint, in 
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of 
Electors . . . .”82  This is because member States will be relying 
on the chief election officials of other member States and the 
outcome of the national popular vote to allocate electoral votes—
rather than the independent discretion of their respective 
legislatures.83  
Admittedly, the Bancorp case has largely been cited for its 
commerce precedent and is rarely used to adjudicate challenges 
to the Compact Clause.84  That being said, a return to the general 
Compact Clause principles will necessitate congressional 
approval, regardless of the indicators’ presence.  This is because 
the NPVIC compact is, on its face and by its text, a political matter 
undoubtedly capable of affecting the rights and power of other 
States as well as the federal government.85  The compact states 
“[t]his article shall govern . . . in each member state,”86 “to 
produce a national popular vote . . . [unless] the electoral college 
is abolished.”87  Additionally, the supporters of the NPVIC even 
 
79. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009); see also Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 
S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (indicating each State has a right to independently control its 
electors).  
80. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2. 
81. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 880 N.W.2d at 849. 
82. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2. 
83. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008). 
84. See, e.g., Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 838 
F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1988); Cont’l Ill. Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517, 1521 n.5 (11th Cir. 
1987); Smith Setzer & Sons v. S.C. Procurement Rev. Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1322 (4th Cir. 
1994); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792, 793 n.16 
(4th Cir. 1991). 
85. See JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 201 
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1920) [hereinafter MADISON, 
CONVENTION NOTES] (discussing the ramifications of various electoral schemes).  
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2753 (2011). 
87. Act of June 12, 2019, ch. 356, 2019 Or. Laws (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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admit, potentially obliviously so, that the compact would 
guarantee the presidency to the member States, that the compact’s 
design is to “remedy” the laws in 48 States, and that the NPVIC 
intends to reshape how federal elections are campaigned for.88   
Now turning a closer eye to these broad principles, it seems 
the NPVIC’s potential impact could have a disastrous toll on the 
supremacy of the United States, as well as the sovereignty of other 
States.  Regarding the impact on supremacy: 
the compact may not authorize member states to do anything 
collectively that they could not do individually.  Second, 
member states must not delegate their sovereignty, but rather 
they must retain their freedom to withdraw from the compact 
at any time.89 
Suppose member States engage in these practices—
collective power enhancement, delegation of sovereignty, and 
conceding the ability to withdrawal—through a compact.  In that 
case, that compact is said to be a potential threat to the supremacy 
of the United States and to non-member States, and that compact 
would require prior congressional approval.90  These concerns are 
very similar to the four indicators previously stated, and thus this 
analysis will be brief.  The NPVIC combines the member States’ 
power to secure for its members the sole ability to determine the 
presidency.91  Alone, no State could achieve this outcome.  Again, 
the States are not free to withdraw without significant restrictions, 
and their withdrawal will potentially be deemed invalid—replete 
with eerily looming enforcement mechanisms left for 
speculation.92  Finally, the sovereign powers of the member States 
have been partially subjugated to the NPVIC, exactly as 
 
88. Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/HSN2-QCV3] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021). 
89. State v. Kurt, 802 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Mo. 1991) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978)).   
90. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854); Virginia v. Tennessee, 
148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893).  
91. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013). 
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019); see also supra notes 65-77 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the member States to the NPVIC are not free to withdraw 
from the compact).   
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contemplated by the broad compact concerns when determining 
the necessity of congressional approval.93 
 Having determined that the NPVIC is an interstate compact 
of the kind that requires congressional approval (with or without 
the presence of the four indicia), the question that remains is what 
recourse a non-member State or the citizen of a member State 
could have if Congress did approve the NPVIC.   
III.  WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD 
STILL FAIL TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL, DESPITE 
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL 
There are a couple of different issues that must be discussed 
before approaching the merits of any potential case against the 
NPVIC.  Both of these issues are theoretically dispositive of the 
case on procedural grounds.  To get to the case’s merits, the 
justiciability doctrine and jurisdiction must be satisfied.94  Briefly 
addressing each concern now, there are no justiciability grounds 
that would dismiss this cause of action because it would be based 
on a non-political question, and most likely, non-member States 
would be filing this suit against the federal government 
(dismissing standing concerns).95  Even if this were a suit against 
one State by another, it is likely to be valid.96  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court may or may not have original jurisdiction to hear 
the complaint, but it could nevertheless reach the Supreme Court 
through appeals.97  
 
93. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying States have 
near plenary power to dictate electors).  
94. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99, 204 (1962). 
95. See id. at 209; see also infra Section III.A. 
96. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405-06 (1821) (“[The Eleventh 
Amendment] does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a 
State and a foreign State.  The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases and in 
these a State may still be sued.”); see also Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934); 
see also infra Section III.A.  
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)-
(2) (1988); Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 393, 399 (“If a State be a party, the jurisdiction of 
this Court is original . . . .  The original jurisdiction of this Court cannot be enlarged, but its 
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in every case cognizable under the third article of the 
constitution . . . .”).   
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Within the merits of the case, the Constitution plainly allots 
the power of elections to the individual States.98  However, 
questions remain regarding the exclusivity of such power.99  
Looking to the Supreme Court’s precedent, the States’ power 
appears to be definitively exclusive, at the cost of federal and 
State interference.100  This conclusion is further aided by the 
founding era’s thoughts and examples.101  Finally, if no legal 
argument is persuasive, the social and political reasons alone 
should be sufficient to halt the NPVIC.  
A. Justiciability Concerns 
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to 
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no 
rule for his government?102 
 
 It is a fundamental principle that the legislature’s mere will 
cannot alter the Constitution absent amendment proceedings.103  
Likewise, the legislative branch cannot pass any laws or take any 
action repugnant to the Constitution.104  Suppose the legislature 
engages in any activity that is thought to be unconstitutional.  In 
that case, it is the Supreme Court’s prerogative to adjudicate 
whether or not there has been legitimate infringement.105  While 
these principles are no doubt ingrained in the hearts of every 
scholar of the law, these principles become increasingly murky 
when dealing with an interstate compact.  Of course, the usual 
justiciability concerns are present with an interstate compact, just 
as with any potential case and controversy brought before the 
 
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
99. See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2318 (2020); Ray v. Blair, 343 
U.S. 214, 225 (1952); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (“The question before 
us is not one of policy but of power . . . .”); see also infra Section III.B.1.  
100. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also infra Section III.B.1.  
101. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 57, 509; see also infra 
Section III.B.2.  
102. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
103. Id. at 177.   
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 177-78.  
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Court.106  However, the Compact Clause’s mandates erect some 
peculiar obstacles to justiciability that need to be addressed.  
The first of these, and most likely to prevent a suit, is the 
political question doctrine.  The decision to approve or disprove 
an interstate compact is undoubtedly one of the legislature’s 
political judgment, rather than one of constitutional judgment 
akin to that of the Supreme Court’s.107  The political question 
doctrine then would seemingly bar the Supreme Court’s review 
of a claim alleging Congress improperly approved an interstate 
compact in violation of a constitutional principle.108  This doctrine 
requires federal courts to determine whether, based on six 
independent factors, a matter is committed to another branch such 
that separation of powers precludes judicial review.109  These 
factors are:  (1) constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
different political branch, (2) the lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards, (3) the need for an initial non-judicial 
policy decision, (4) the potential for any judicial decision to 
indicate a lack of respect to the coordinate branch, (5) the need to 
adhere to a political decision already made, or (6) the potential for 
embarrassment after multiple branches have resolved the issue 
differently.110 
This bar is especially present when the claim is based on a 
violation of the Guarantee Clause, which the Court has explicitly 
labeled a political question.111  The Guarantee Clause requires 
every State of the Union to be guaranteed a republican form of 
government.112  In other words, some fashion of a representative 
 
106. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (applying the justiciability standards 
to that case because it arose under the Federal Constitution); see also Virginia v. Tennessee, 
148 U.S. 503, 517 (1893) (Compact Clause cases arise under the Federal Constitution).  
107. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 485 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
108. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
109. Id. at 211, 217.  
110. Id. at 217.  
111. Id. at 224 (“[C]hallenges to congressional action on the ground of inconsistency 
with [the Guarantee Clause] present no justiciable question.”).  There is, however, some 
debate as to whether this bar still exists with the same force.  See Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 71-72 (1988) (citing circuit court decisions as well as Supreme Court decisions that 
indicate the Guarantee Clause may still be used to adjudicate cases). 
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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government must be present across the nation.113  Here, it is 
abundantly clear that any claim against establishing a national 
popular vote would incorporate that very clause;114 however, that 
may not be the only alleged constitutional violation possible.  If a 
claim touches on the Guarantee Clause but also relies on the 
violation of another constitutional principle, the claim may still 
be heard assuming the alternative violation does not likewise fall 
under the Court’s political question bar.115  
Thus, it is necessary to determine what other constitutional 
principles might be violated by congressional approval if any suit 
is maintained against an interstate compact establishing a national 
popular vote.  Although still potentially problematic, the 
requirement of a system of electors, also known as the 
Presidential Electors Clause, found in Article II, Section 1 and the 
Twelfth Amendment, would undoubtedly be violated with the 
establishment of a national popular vote.116   
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held (although stepped 
back in more recent cases)117 that the Constitution provides 
citizens an affirmative right to vote.118  While not considered a 
natural, unalienable right, it is still considered fundamental.119  
Because of the fundamental nature of the right to vote,120 the 
NPVIC could be subject to attack for equal protection and due 
process violations.121  This would likely stem from individuals 
who felt they were now disenfranchised from their vote due to 
their State’s sparse population.  As the Supreme Court has said, 
 
113. See THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 194 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1880) (defining 
republican government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”). 
114. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 141 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
115. Baker, 369 U.S. at 227. 
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  The cause of such a 
violation will be discussed in more detail in Section III.B. 
117. E.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional 
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States . . . .”). 
118. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
119. Id.  
120. Id.  
121. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104, 110. 
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“[a] citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because 
he lives in the city or on the farm.”122  
While it is important to note these additional means in which 
the NPVIC might be attacked, this Comment will only focus on 
the most ambiguous and challenging means of invalidating the 
NPVIC:  the idea that the compact is a violation of the Presidential 
Electors Clause, which establishes the Electoral College.123  This 
is partly because this Comment aims to avoid discussing 
individual rights and instead discusses the right of States as 
sovereign entities (which presumptively have no right to sue for 
due process/equal protection violations124). 
The distinction between reliance on the Guarantee Clause for 
a potential suit versus the Presidential Electors Clause is 
admittedly sparse.  Still, the distinction is nevertheless present in 
that the Guarantee Clause helps define a judicially enforceable 
requirement in the Constitution.  The use of the Guarantee Clause 
to define the meaning of the electoral requirement is different 
from the Supreme Court’s potential to “disrupt a State’s 
republican regime” by enforcing a government system the Court 
deems more akin to a republic, which would violate the political 
question doctrine.125  The Guarantee Clause will only be used 
here as a means of textual interpretation and not to determine what 
that clause alone requires of the States.  
A suit against the NPVIC, predicated on the violation of the 
Presidential Electors clause, is not a political question.  This is 
because the suit, although first requiring Congress to exercise its 
constitutionally committed judgment,126 would be against a 
potential violation of the Constitution.127  This case would only 
 
122. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)). 
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
124. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966).  But see Shelby 
Cnty. v. Alabama, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). 
125. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962). 
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23 
(1892).  The State of Michigan was sued for improperly appointing electoral members in 
violation of the Constitution.  McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23.  The Court found that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case saying:  
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be brought after Congress gave its consent to the interstate 
compact, and “once Congress gives its consent, a compact 
between States—like any other federal statute—becomes the law 
of the land.”128   
When the question presented to the Court is whether 
congressional activity has violated the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court can hear the case regardless of potential political 
concerns.129  The political question doctrine is not designed to 
prevent the Court from hearing legitimate constitutional 
questions.130  Instead, the political question doctrine, under the 
guise that the Court does not have that power under the 
Constitution, is designed to bar the Court from hearing truly 
political matters and, in so doing, questioning coordinate 
branches’ judgments or rationales.131  This is the difference 
between asking whether a coordinate branch can do something 
versus whether it should do something.  The former can be heard 
by the Court, whereas the latter is barred.132   
The validity of Congress approving the NPVIC falls under 
that first category.  Regardless of the NPVIC’s potential merits, a 
suit against congressional approval would simply be asking 
whether such approval was an appropriate use of Congress’s 
constitutional powers.  In this respect, no deference is deserved, 
nor any embarrassment incurred by asking whether the 
Constitution was violated.133  
 
it is said that all questions connected with the election of a presidential elector 
are political in their nature; that the court has no power finally to dispose of 
them; and that its decision would be subject to review by political officers and 
agencies, as the state board of canvassers, the legislature in joint convention, 
and the governor, or, finally, the Congress.  But the judicial power of the 
United States extends to all cases in law or equity arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and this is a case so arising . . . . 
Id.  
128. Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018).  
129. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968). 
130. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11, 217. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 217 (“The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to 
whether some action . . . exceeds constitutional authority.”).  
133. See id. at 218; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“It is most 
true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not.  [B]ut it is equally true, that it 
must take jurisdiction if it should.  The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a 
measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution.  We cannot pass it by because 
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Assuming for a moment that the violation of the mandate for 
the Electoral College is sufficient to state a claim, it must be 
agreed that the case would meet the other justiciability 
requirements exclusively on that alleged violation for the suit to 
commence absent subsequent equal protection or due process 
claims. 
Given that any potential case brought to the Supreme Court 
after enacting the NPVIC likely cannot be directly contingent on 
the Guarantee Clause,134 the remaining causes of action must 
provide a sufficiently justiciable case regarding standing.  As 
discussed above, this Comment will only consider the 
Presidential Electors Clause.   
The recent case brought by the Attorney General in Texas 
regarding the 2020 election may initially seem dispositive of this 
question; however, the two causes of action are irreconcilably 
different.135  Standing generally requires injury, causation, and 
redressability.136  Causation is essentially a given when “the 
plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at 
issue.”137  However, States have special standing, or relaxed 
standing, to bring suits to enforce their sovereign rights.138  This 
level of standing alleviates the need to show injury.139  More 
recent cases of State suits against the federal government fail to 
even contemplate State standing and tacitly accept the State’s 
standing to sue.140  Thus, the difference between a suit against the 
 
it is doubtful.  With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we 
must decide it if it be brought before us.  We have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.  The one or the other would 
be treason to the constitution.”).  
134. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 227. 
135. Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020).  
136. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
137. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  
138. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (allowing Missouri to bring 
suit against the United States for entering into a treaty in violation of Missouri’s perceived 
regulatory rights, but ultimately rejecting the claim because no regulatory rights existed 
there).  
139. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (allowing a State suit against the 
federal government for violating the State’s sovereign rights); Tarah Leigh Grove, When Can 
a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 862 n.54 (2016) (discussing a 
State’s special sovereignty).  
140. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (immediately 
discussing the substantive rights of a State without first discussing any potential justiciability 
bars); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).  
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NPVIC and the suit launched by Texas, and what in turn makes 
the presented hypothetical suit sustainable, is that it is predicated 
on federal or state infringement of a State right, satisfying 
standing.141  
However, it is possible that a suit against the NPVIC could 
also be launched (either by a member State or a non-member 
State) against a member State or multiple member States.  If this 
were to be the case, it would initially seem that the standing 
concerns are the same as a suit against the federal government.142  
Despite those initial impressions, the Court has on occasion 
restricted the capacity of one State to sue another, requiring 
“absolute necessity” to exercise jurisdiction.143  They have gone 
as far as to require “serious magnitude and imminent” injury be 
“clearly shown . . . .”144  There is undoubtedly a more significant 
burden on a State to establish standing than that of a private 
individual in a suit against another State.  However, this increased 
burden appears to be inconsequential given the gravity of the 
topic.  
It is important to note that another underlying tenant of the 
justiciability doctrine is that the Court must have jurisdiction in 
the first place to hear the matter.145  The Constitution provides 
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases where a State 
would be made a party as well as those in which the United States 
is a named party.146  Congress cannot reduce this original 
jurisdiction.147  That being said, the Court has been reluctant to 
exercise its original jurisdiction in specific cases.148  If the Court’s 
 
141. See Grove, supra note 139, at 862 n.54.  This distinction may apply less fervently 
in the case of a member State given that it sought this legislation voluntarily and thus is not 
afforded the same protection of the rights it ceded.  See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); Merritt, supra note 111, at 17-18.  
142. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more 
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy.  Be 
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the 
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).  
143. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934).  
144. Id. at 292. 
145. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1962). 
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 
(1803).  
147. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138. 
148. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976) (“[T]he pending state-court 
action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered here may be litigated.”). 
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exercise of jurisdiction remains consistent, a post-congressional-
approval case against the NPVIC likely will not be heard under 
original jurisdiction.  Regardless though, this hypothetical case 
could still be heard at the federal level.  It just may have to reach 
the Supreme Court as a course of appeals.149 
While there is some question as to whether a State could sue 
a member State, alleging that the NPVIC violates the complaining 
State’s rights, it is undoubtedly clear that there would be no 
question as to the possibility of a suit between a State and the 
United States.  Having sufficiently determined that the 
justiciability concerns would not preclude review of an interstate 
compact after congressional approval, when a suit is based on a 
violation of the Presidential Electors Clause, the merits of the case 
remain.  
B. Substantive Concerns 
Assuming that the Supreme Court has not yet dismissed the 
case for want of procedural requirements, the case’s merits must 
sufficiently justify a ruling against the NPVIC.  The merits of the 
case will be discussed below by first looking into the plain text of 
the Constitution as well as the Court’s interpretation of the same.  
Then this Comment will discuss both the founding era arguments 
against the NPVIC and the modern-day social and political 
arguments against the NPVIC.  
1. Plain Text of the Constitution and Judicial Interpretation 
The Constitution merely orders that each State must appoint 
electors equal to its number of representatives in Congress as 
directed by its State legislature.150  These electors must meet in 
their respective States and vote via ballot for the President and 
Vice President separately.151  Nowhere in the Constitution are 
electors of a State directed to vote based on specific criteria.152  
Despite the Founders’ suggestion that the only criterion was to be 
 
149. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257(a) (1988). 
150. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
152. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020). 
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the electors’ independent decision, and no vote was to be cast at 
the direction of any law,153 this is simply not present on the face 
of the Constitution.154  As a result of the lack of instruction in this 
matter, the requirement of an electoral body must first be defined 
by examining the totality of the document.  If ambiguity persists, 
the practices at the time of ratification should prevail.155 
Taking the entire Constitution into account, the States were 
intended to remain as several unionized sovereigns instead of 
forming a single sovereign entity.156  In addition, the Constitution 
promises to these several States a “Republican Form of 
Government[.]”157  This edict for a republican form of 
government modifies the establishment of an electorate system.  
However, there is no authoritative mandate in the text of the 
Constitution regarding federal interference with the States’ 
exclusive ability to generate presidential electors pursuant to their 
independent form of a republican government.  Therefore, a case 
predicated on such interference must rely on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of what little is enumerated. 
The Court has not always favored federalism.  It has often 
received the tail end of the Court’s generosity, if any attention at 
all.158  This inattention was somewhat alleviated when the Court 
decided National League of Cities v. Usery.159  In that case, the 
Supreme Court determined that there are, in fact, limitations to 
the federal government’s power to regulate commerce.160  These 
 
153. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 351 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
155. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-92 (2008) (applying 
a textualist/originalist approach in interpreting the Constitution).  
156. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 196-97 
(James Madison) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 720 (1838) (recognizing the States are “sovereign 
within their respective boundaries”); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) 
(describing the States as “neighbors members of a single” or “quasi-sovereignties bound 
together in the Union”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (saying the 
Eleventh Amendment exists to “confirm[]” the presumption that “each State is a sovereign 
entity in our federal system”). 
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937) (saying 
the federal power to regulate commerce is plenary in nature).   
159. 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).  
160. Id. at 842. 
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limitations are predicated on the belief that the several States 
retain some sovereignty.161  The Court determined that the federal 
government could not legislatively displace areas deemed to be 
the traditional government functions of the States—such as the 
wages set for government employees—even when the power 
invoked by Congress was outlined in the Constitution.162  It said 
this bar was found implicitly in the Tenth Amendment.163   
While it would be refreshing to reinvigorate the Tenth 
Amendment in this way, the text of that Amendment simply does 
not contain any language to support this protection.164  
Additionally, the Court later found that the National League of 
Cities rule, barring the infringement on “traditional governmental 
function[s],” was unworkable and did not protect the sovereignty 
of States.165  As a result of these two blunders, that case was 
summarily overturned.166  
The case that replaced National League of Cities provided 
an equally ambiguous test to determine whether a particular State 
right existed and, if so, whether the federal government could 
regulate in that area or if State sovereignty barred its control.167  
That case was Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, which also dealt with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s 
(FLSA) minimum wage requirements concerning government 
employees.168   
The Court there found that the Constitution provides both 
limits and avenues to impose federal control.169  In so doing, the 
Court rejected alternative theories that had previously protected 
the States’ rights, such as protection from federal infringement 
upon “‘uniquely’ governmental functions” or “‘necessary’ 
governmental services . . . .”170  Instead, the Court provided that 
the Constitution’s structure protects the States from federal 
 
161. Id. 
162. See id. 
163. Id. at 842-43.  
164. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 12.  
165. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).  
166. Id. 
167. See id. at 556; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 15. 
168. 469 U.S. at 530.  
169. Id. at 547. 
170. Id. at 545. 
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infringement on their sovereignty.171  It went on to say 
enumerated barriers in the Constitution must justify any restraint 
on federal power.172  These barriers can be a double-edged sword 
cutting both for and against the sovereignty of the States.173  The 
Court pointed out that the Constitution provides explicit areas that 
Congress may regulate in Article 1, Sections 8 and 10.174  Paired 
with the Supremacy Clause, the Court held that the States’ 
sovereignty was diminished upon ratification, but it is not gone.175  
Since Garcia, additional precedent has shed light on the 
notion of State power to control elections.  In Shelby County v. 
Holder, the Court not only upheld the premise of Garcia’s 
federalism construction, but also explicitly acknowledged Tenth 
Amendment protections for state-controlled elections.176  
Specifically, it said “the Framers of the Constitution intended the 
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth 
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.”177  The Court also 
assured that the several States retained equal sovereignty.178 
The rule presently regarding federalism is that the federal 
government may only regulate where it has been granted that 
express authority.179  It is also important to reiterate that the States 
are, in fact, independent sovereigns, although they have 
surrendered some power by their status as members of the 
Union.180  Much like a surgeon, the federal government may only 
operate in the areas in which it has previously been given 
informed consent.181 
 
171. Id. at 552. 
172. See id. at 554. 
173. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548.   
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013).  This differs from Nat’l League of Cities in that the 
Holder Court relied on enumerated State safeguards. 
177. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991)). 
178. Id. at 544. 
179. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543. 
180. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543. 
181. Jon F. Merz & Baruch Fischhoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational 
Consent: Cognitive Limitations on Decision-Making, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 321, 322 (1990) 
(“[T]he law has placed upon physicians a duty to disclose information regarding diagnosis 
and treatment . . . .”); Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2333 (2020) (quoting U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
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Indeed, the Garcia Court quoted James Madison 
affirmatively when he said, “[i]f the power was not given, 
Congress could not exercise it . . . .”182  The Court reasoned this 
constitutional protection is granted to the States as evidenced in 
part by the voting rights that the States retained, namely, the 
ability to elect the federal executive and legislative branches.183  
Indeed, the Court went on to say that, at least regarding the 
Commerce Clause, substantive restraints on federal power should 
be “tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national 
political process . . . .”184  This has been interpreted broadly to 
apply to all potential federal interference with State 
sovereignty.185  Additionally, the Tenth Amendment’s 
protections for enumerated States’ rights has recently been 
enforced.186 
National League of Cities and Garcia provide an alternative 
mode of transportation for the Court to discuss federalism (an 
attempt at a pun).  Still, they are nonetheless demonstrative of the 
federal government’s ability to regulate the Electoral College.187  
Under this analytical regime, any interstate compact that creates 
a popular vote, as the NPVIC does, is an impermissible 
infringement on the States’ sovereignty after being adopted by 
Congress. 
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Garcia, the way the 
United States’ government is arranged explicitly recognizes the 
States’ rights as sovereigns.188  Phrased another way, the States’ 
 
ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual 
State.”)). 
182. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549. 
183. Id. at 550-51.  
184. Id. at 554.  
185. Merritt, supra note 111, at 15; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 326 (1966) (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)) 
(establishing the “basic test to be applied” to determine the veracity of federal interference 
with State sovereignty).  The Court in Katzenbach applied this test to an alleged violation of 
State sovereignty authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment despite the fact that the test 
originated from a potential federal violation predicated by the Commerce Clause.  The use 
of this test shows the interchangeability of tests designed to determine federal overreaching 
despite the genesis of the federal government’s actions.   
186. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543, 556-57 (2013); Chiafalo, 140 
S. Ct.  at 2322-23, 2333. 
187. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.  
188. Id. at 549, 554.  
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sovereignty is found in the Constitution by the plain text of the 
Constitution (specifically that text which defines the structure of 
government).189  Here, the cause of action being raised is 
predicated on the same State sovereignty evidenced by 
constitutional decree.190  It could be argued that the Presidential 
Electors Clause is an explicit acknowledgment of State 
sovereignty in that area.191  Indeed, that was argued in Bush v. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board when the Court, per 
curiam, said:  
[I]n the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable 
not only to elections to state offices, but also to the selection 
of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely 
under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by 
virtue of a direct grant of authority made under [the 
Presidential Electors Clause].192 
However, assuming that the Presidential Electors Clause 
alone is insufficient to show that control of the Electoral College 
is the exclusive right of the State, the Garcia Court went on to 
recognize that a crucial element of State sovereignty, implied by 
the way the Constitution created the governmental system, is the 
ability of the States to solely elect the president and congress.193  
Thus, the Constitution ordains the right to elect the President as a 
sovereign power of all the States.194  
Additional evidence that the right to oversee the vote for 
President and the right to form the Electoral College is 
exclusively the right of the States can be found in Chiafalo v. 
Washington.195  In that case, three electors from the State of 
 
189. See id. at 554.  
190. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.  
191. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“Article II, § 1’s appointments power gives the 
States far-reaching authority over presidential electors, absent some other constitutional 
constraint.”). 
192. 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000). 
193. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (“The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection 
both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.”).  
194. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“[N]othing in the Constitution expressly prohibits 
States from [controlling] presidential electors’ voting discretion . . . .”). 
195. Id. at 2319-20.  For an even more recent acknowledgement of such State 
exclusivity, one need not look any further than the shambling mound of cases dismissed in 
favor of States’ rights during and after the 2020 presidential election.  See Joshua A. Douglas, 
Undue Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation, 30 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
(forthcoming).  
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Washington voted against the candidate that won the statewide 
popular vote.196  The Court upheld Washington’s use of a civil 
sanction against these “faithless elector[s],” saying that, “[t]he 
Constitution’s text and the Nation’s history both support allowing 
a State to enforce . . . far-reaching authority over presidential 
electors . . . ‘conveying the broadest power of determination’ over 
. . . the power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includ[ing] 
power to condition his appointment[.]”197  
Because the right of States to vote for President and control 
the Electoral College (the States’ election rights) are exclusive, 
they cannot be infringed by federal regulation,198 much like any 
other exclusive State power cannot be (the power to regulate the 
health and welfare of a State’s citizenry for example).199  While 
the Court has sometimes allowed federal infringement of States’ 
rights when there exists a legitimate end for the interference, 
those instances are predicated on infringement of an implicit right 
of the States after the federal government was granted express 
permission to regulate there by the Constitution or subsequent 
amendments.200  This case is the opposite of those.  The 
Constitution explicitly authorizes States to appoint presidential 
electors as the legislature of that State sees fit.201  
At best, there is only implicit power for the federal 
government to regulate the States’ election rights.  This implicit 
power could arguably spawn from the Civil War and other voting 
rights amendments’ broad grants of regulatory authority, 
especially regarding elections.202  However, this extension of 
authority is not infinite.  Notably, this power extends only to the 
enforcement of those amendments.203  No doubt some proponents 
 
196. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322.  
197. Id. at 2322, 2323-24.  
198. Id.; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551. 
199. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (limiting congressional 
regulation to only those constitutionally expressed areas and barring regulation that would 
infringe on a State’s law-making power for the health of its citizens). 
200. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (citing to United States 
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)). See also M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
406 (1819) (discussing the inability of the State to tax instruments of the federal 
government).  
201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
202. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
203. Id. 
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of the NPVIC claim a violation of those amendments is occurring 
under the existing electoral systems.204  However, it is hard to 
fathom that such a systemic issue has existed for as long as it has 
without any substantial prior acknowledgement of such a heinous 
defect.  If the Electoral College negatively impacts the individuals 
protected by those amendments, the Electoral College 
undoubtedly would be an ancient relic of the invidious past, just 
as literacy tests, poll taxes, white primaries, and abundant 
violence are.   
To say that the Electoral College is in the same category as 
the aforementioned practices, and is thus subject to regulation by 
the same amendments, is mere convenient political jiggery-
pokery.  The Electoral College, assuredly being different in kind 
than what the voting and Civil War Amendments were conceived 
to protect, cannot be regulated by such methods.  Even if 
regulation was permissible though, the NPVIC is a far cry from 
the rational basis of those noble causes, let alone the quasi-narrow 
tailoring required.205 
The NPVIC would eradicate some States’ abilities, and the 
values of others, to enforce their election rights.  Any federal 
regulation, including the interstate compact’s approval, 
interfering with these rights is not predicated on any express 
constitutional authorization of the federal government’s power.206  
There is no conceivable basis in the Constitution or its 
amendments authorizing such federal insight into this exclusive 
State power.  This would be an impermissible federal regulation 
of a State’s constitutional powers under the Presidential Electors 
Clause,207 and the Constitution generally. 
The member States may have a more difficult time finding 
friendly litigation, given they sought out the surrendering of their 
rights voluntarily, but they are potentially not without recourse.208  
While the more modern precedent does trend toward procedurally 
 
204. See Faith Karimi, Why the Electoral College Has Long Been Controversial, 
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/XV9F-6J6G] (Oct. 10, 2020, 6:59 AM). 
205. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542, 545 (2013). 
206. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I (laying out the powers of Congress).  
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
208. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798-99, 808 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 720, 723 (1997). 
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barring State suits against other States,209 a State is still capable 
of suing another for infringement on its sovereign powers.210  This 
is true even after that infringement occurs pursuant to joint 
action.211  If the merits of the case are heard, the just outcome in 
either instance (State v. State or State v. United States) favors the 
right of the State to freely exercise its sovereign powers without 
impediment from federal law or other State law.  
To be as straightforward as possible:  the right of the States 
to control their election procedures is exclusive, as defined under 
the Garcia framework.212  Any exclusive right may only be 
abridged by the federal government if there is informed consent 
to do so (evidenced by a clause in the Constitution or its 
amendments).213  While there are clauses granting such power to 
the federal government, these clauses are narrow and the powers 
implicit.214  Moreover, the Electoral College is not at all related 
to what these clauses are designed to remedy.  Additionally, there 
is no indication that the NPVIC can address these concerns; even 
if it is determined they are present with the Electoral College.  To 
continue the medical analogy, there is at best informed consent 
for the federal government to conduct as minimally intrusive a 
procedure as possible to remedy an exceedingly unique condition.  
The Electoral College is not an etiology of that unique condition 
and the NPVIC is not that minimally intrusive procedure.  If the 
plain language and interpretation thereof is not sufficient to bar 
the NPVIC, the legislative history of the Constitution and relevant 
clauses may be persuasive. 
 
 
209. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1900); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 
282 U.S. 660, 669, 674 (1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).   
210. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 
558 U.S. 256, 268 (2010) (“That the standard for intervention in original actions by nonstate 
entities is high, however, does not mean that it is insurmountable.”). 
211. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more 
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy.  Be 
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the 
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).  
212. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985). 
213. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2334 (2020); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549. 
214. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
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2. Founding Era Thoughts and Examples 
How the citizens of each State would be represented in the 
federal government was discussed at length during the ratification 
of the Constitution.215  Still, only a sparse mandate made it into 
the final draft.216  Although it is the least desirable and most 
speculative course of action, the lack of definitive text may 
require a delving into the Founders’ minds and those who 
followed.  The framers defined the election powers of a 
republican system of government as not being comprised by the 
will of the people but rather the will of political bodies that 
represent the people.217  This definition appears to be consistent 
with the common understanding around the time of ratification.218  
Beyond dictionary definitions, the understanding of a republican 
government’s election can be demonstrated through the practical 
applications of such a system cited by the Founders, namely 
existing State constitutions at the time of ratification.219 
For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 
established a method for choosing the president and vice-
president of the State where the several counties of the State 
would elect members of the general assembly and council 
members.220  Those elected officials would then choose the 
persons to fill the executive office of the State.221  Similar 
processes of indirectly elected executives existed in every State 
at this time.222  While these State examples of an executive 
 
215. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 284, 509. 
216. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.   
217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 198 (James Madison). 
218. Republican Government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (defining 
Republican Government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”); JOHN 
BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2902 (8th ed. 
1914). 
219. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6, 584-86 (2008); 
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19; MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25 (stating the governor of the State 
is elected by vote of both houses of the legislature with the senate being elected by county 
representatives and the general assembly being elected directly by the people); DEL. CONST. 
of 1776 art. 7 (“A president or chief magistrate shall be chosen by joint ballot of both houses 
. . . .”). 
220. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19. 
221. Id. 
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 195 (James Madison); see, e.g., MD. 
CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7.  
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election process are engaged in by the legislative bodies,223 the 
Founders of the Constitution felt that the selection of a President 
would be better assigned to an independent, single-purpose, 
electoral body (as opposed to an executive elected by the 
legislatures or the people directly).224  This conclusion was 
reached after a full and frank discussion of the several election 
processes available, including the potential use of a popular 
vote.225  The framers also indicated their decision was predicated 
on failed or failing foreign examples of direct democracies.226 
The Founders’ definition of the Presidential Electors Clause 
and the examples relied on to create the electoral system should 
be more than dispositive of what the Constitution requires.  
However, the philosophical ideas behind this portion of the 
Constitution may be necessary to convince the most ardent 
proponents of the NPVIC.  The framers’ arguments on behalf of 
the Electoral College generally entail three substantial areas.227  
These are the avoidance of cliques, the separation of coordinate 
branches, and electing the most competent executive officer.228  
While the separation of coordinate branches in electing a 
President is undoubtedly essential, in the context of a popular 
vote, the first and the last concerns are the most relevant.  Under 
the first concern, the framers thought that a group or individual 
could elicit the support of many individuals and improperly seek 
out the presidency in a nationwide popular vote such that there 
 
223. See MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7; PA. CONST. of 
1776, § 19. 
224. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 509 (saying that an 
independent electoral system would avoid the “great evil of cabal” because each slate of 
electors would be states away from another).   
225. Id. at 320-21.  
226. See, e.g., id. at 268 (looking to the election of an executive in Poland); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 23-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan 
eds., 2001) (discussing Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage—saying “[t]here have been, if 
I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars”).  
227. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 452-53 
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON, 
CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268-69, 284.   
228. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
268-69, 284.   
3 BARNES.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:49 PM 
526 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:3 
 
could be no counter to a powerful individual playing on the 
excitement of society.229  Specifically, it was said that: 
      The additional securities to republican government, to 
liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption of 
the plan, consist chiefly in the restraints which the 
preservation of the union will impose upon local factions and 
insurrections, and upon the ambition of powerful individuals 
in single states, who might acquire credit and influence 
enough, from leaders and favourites, to become the despots 
of the people . . . .230 
Or that the people “will be led by a few active and designing 
men.”231  This would be aided by the fact that the larger States 
would likely support a candidate from their State to the detriment 
of any small State who opposed them.232  In essence, the fear of 
cliques was the fear that someone could seize control through 
force and fear, as individuals are more susceptible to 
radicalization than separate and detached institutions.233  There 
are cliques that the framers discussed composed not of the people, 
but of the other coordinate branches.234  Again, this is not in direct 
relation to the NPVIC.   
The framers also feared that the people en masse would not 
be capable of selecting the most competent candidate.235  This 
was in part due to the lack of reliable and easily obtainable 
information regarding national events.236  Indeed, the framers 
 
229. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, 
supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton). 
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton). 
231. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.  
232. Id. at 268, 284.  
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (George W. Cary & James 
McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 257 (James Madison) (George W. Cary 
& James McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander 
Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.  
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 353 (Alexander Hamilton); 
MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (describing Governor Morris’s 
advocacy for a national popular vote to avoid an executive branch dependent on the will of 
the legislature).  
235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan 
eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (Mr. Sherman saying 
“[t]he [people] will never be sufficiently informed of characters”).  
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 235, at 447-48 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(saying the people at large have no means to acquire personal observation of presidential 
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talked repeatedly about the need for the electoral group to be 
diverse enough to reference national issues as opposed to local 
issues.237  The other half of this concern stemmed from the fact 
that even if the people as a whole had the opportunity to be 
informed, the information would not necessarily be accurate.238  
At best it is second-hand knowledge of a candidate and at worse 
it is akin to the game of telephone, even though a highly efficient 
game of telephone, with all the underlying inaccuracies.  To this 
end, the framers said, “[a] small number of persons, selected by 
their fellow citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to 
possess the information and discernment requisite to so 
complicated an investigation.”239  
The framers and indeed the generations that followed 
deemed, through implication of continued use despite significant 
criticism,240 this system of election superior to a direct 
democracy.241  However, the relevancy of their reasoning may 
differ in the modern world.  To answer the relevancy question, it 
is necessary to look at the changes that have occurred since then 
that might impact the historic rationales. 
3. Social and Political Arguments Against a Popular Vote 
You have to remember one thing about the will of the people:  




candidates and all information that is received is filtered through the lens of trusted 
individuals—albeit unelected—anyway); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
269 (Colonel Mason saying “it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character 
for [president] to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man”).   
237. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 172-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary 
& James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 269.   
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton). 
239. Id. 
240. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1969) (saying that the Presidential Electors Clause “has probably been 
the subject of more proposed amendments than any other provision of the Constitution”).  
241. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII (changing the selection 
process of Vice President but retaining the Electoral College). 
242. Mark Dawidziak, Jon Stewart Blurs the Lines Between Jester and Journalist, THE 
PLAIN DEALER, [https://perma.cc/G22T-FJDA] (Mar. 28, 2019, 12:49 AM). 
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Some people in modern America may be taken aback by the 
previous section’s idea that the general public is incapable of 
discerning a proper presidential candidate.  To support this 
outrage, the speed at which news is provided could be noted.  
Likewise, the presidential candidates’ coverage could be cited.  
Regardless of either argument, however, political society as a 
whole has not drastically changed, despite our increased access to 
media.243  The presidential candidates do not visit or invest their 
campaigning into more than just a few States,244 nor does the 
available media generally provide one-on-one access to the 
presidential candidates.245  We may know more about the world 
around us now, but the accuracy of that information has remained 
essentially unchanged.246  Some even argue that this surplus of 
 
243. Compare Shawn Garvey, A Positive Look at Negative Campaigns, 8 LBJ J. PUB. 
AFFS. 13, 14 (1996) (“[W]hat his opposition claimed would result if Jefferson won the 
presidential election of 1800:  ‘Murder, robbery, rape, adultery and incest will be openly 
taught and practiced,’ warned the Federalist press[,]” and “[t]he 1884 presidential race . . .” 
where “Cleveland, widely rumored to have fathered an illegitimate son, was targeted by a 
Republican campaign attack song:  ‘Ma, ma, where’s my pa? Gone to Washington, ha, ha, 
ha’” and “[a] famous 1964 Lyndon Johnson campaign commercial began with a little girl 
plucking the petals from a daisy.  Within seconds, a nuclear explosion erupted in the 
background, and a mushroom cloud enveloped the little girl.”), with Gabriel Tate, The Mud-
Slingers: The Most Shocking Presidential Attack Ads Ever Aired, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 
2016), [https://perma.cc/NFR4-TPJS] (discussing a 1988 ad suggesting rapists and murders 
would be freed upon election of the ad’s opponent and a 2016 ad suggesting that the ad’s 
opponent lacked the fortitude to protect against “external threats to American security”). 
244. 94% of 2016 Presidential Campaign Was in Just 12 Closely Divided States, 
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/E6CS-UVBN] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); Tollar 
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 19-20 (discussing the history of presidential campaigning and 
how geographically limited said campaigning has been).  
245. Compare 1858 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, 
[https://perma.cc/AHC7-HSPL] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (stating that only 7 debates 
occurred, all in one State, spanning only 3 months, with no crowd involvement in the 1858 
Lincoln-Douglas debates), with 2000 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, 
[https://perma.cc/JD3J-NXCJ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (explaining how only three 
presidential debates occurred in 2000, in one month’s time, with minimal crowd involvement 
in one of the three debates), and 2020 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, 
[https://perma.cc/754A-6RNW] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (describing how only two 
presidential debates occurred in 2020, with no crowd involvement).  
246. Janet A. Hall, When Political Campaigns Turn to Slime: Establishing a Virginia 
Fair Campaign Practices Committee, 7 J.L. & POL. 353, 366 (1991) (stating that 
“[c]ampaign falsity statutes . . . are generally unenforced”); Maximilian J. Mescall, Make 
Campaign Coverage Great Again: Presidential Campaigns, the Pres, and the Rights of 
Access, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1653, 1653, 1657 (2018) (stating “more Americans follow 
the news” despite the fact that “journalists continue to act as moderators” as they did “[i]n 
early American History . . . as ‘gatekeepers by adhering to a developed set of ethical 
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information makes discerning the quality information from the 
rubbish more difficult.247 
That being said, it seems readily apparent that the current 
system simply cannot continue without some modification.  
Regardless of the system’s merits, if the social outcry is 
substantial enough, the practical implementation becomes so 
frustrated as to exhaust all hope of success.  Recent events have 
yielded a plethora of research into the average American’s 
mindset and faith in the electoral process.248  Generally, the 
verdict against the process is not pleasant.249  The need for a 
trusted and reliable system of elections is arguably more 
important than the actual process that occurs.   
In that vein, any proposed system must be consistently 
applicable and transparent.  Likely, a successful system would not 
be subjected to potential manipulation by a single individual or 
small subset of society.  Other concerns that have prevailed, 
despite the erosion of time, include the possibility that cliques will 
form and, as discussed above, the potential that the most 
 
norms’”) (quoting Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 72 
(2016)).  
247. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should be Good 
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 437, 449 (2008); Joan Deppa, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance Symposium: 
International Terrorism: Prevention and Remedies, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 25, 
28 (1996) (discussing how too much media coverage after terror events may violate the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, confuse the facts, and encourage further violence); 
Paul Carrington, Too Much Publicity, 27 TEX. BAR J. 75, 76 (1964) (explaining the “excess 
of publicity has been called a ‘discredit to the American system of justice’”).   
248. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, but Nearly Half Expect to Have 
Difficulties Voting, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/4WBF-GCA6] 
(researching the impact Covid-19 had on voter confidence) [hereinafter Election 2020: 
Voters are Highly Engaged]; Nick Laughlin & Peyton Shelburne, How Voters’ Trust in 
Elections Shifted in Response to Biden’s Victory, MORNING CONSULT (Jan. 19, 2021), 
[https://perma.cc/3V8H-VH4M] (polling the impacts of violence and voter fraud on voter 
confidence in the electoral system). 
249. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, supra note 248 (stating 49% of 
voters believed it would be difficult to vote in the 2020 elections); Laughlin & Shelburne, 
supra note 248 (stating only 27% of registered republicans “say they trust the United States’ 
election system either ‘a lot’ or ‘some’” as of January 10, 2021); Deep Divisions in Views of 
the Election Process—and Whether It Will Be Clear Who Won, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 14, 
2020), [https://perma.cc/G8AR-QCWZ] (stating that only 22% of registered voters, polled 
from Sept 30 to Oct 5, 2020, are very confident that “[a]fter all the votes are counted, it will 
be clear which candidate won the election”); Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply in 
U.S., GALLUP (Feb. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZX7Z-AGRJ] (stating that only 30% of 
Americans said they had confidence in the honesty of elections in 2016).  
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competent candidate will not prevail.250  A foundation-era 
concern that was only slightly voiced then but is far more 
significant in modern times is voter suppression and the suffrage 
of all citizens.251  
The NPVIC does not, and cannot, protect against these 
concerns.  First, even if it practically does not achieve this 
outcome, the NPVIC will most likely be perceived by a 
significant portion of the Nation’s voters as a way of 
disenfranchising their vote.  This can be evidenced by the existing 
arguments launched against the NPVIC,252 which can be expected 
to intensify upon its potential adoption.  Likewise, the NPVIC 
cannot address the concerns for consistency and reliability 
required of any electoral system.  For example, a vast exodus from 
or to a highly populous member-state could potentially drastically 
alter the outcome of the NPVIC’s vote.  This change would be 
substantial and could occur rapidly without any limitation on how 
frequently it could occur.  This may seem far-fetched, but again, 
the primary concern with an election system is how trusted and 
reliable it is by the people, regardless of the actual capacity for it 
to be altered.  To its credit, the NPVIC could likely end the impact 
of gerrymandering.  It would do so by simply ignoring any sparse 
or minority populations—an ironic example of the idiom “the 
medicine is worse than the disease.”  Another of the major 
concerns that the founding fathers had was that cliques could be 
raised to change the results of an election forcibly.253  This 
 
250. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
268-69, 284. 
251. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 286 (“There was one 
difficulty however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people.  The 
right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the 
latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.”). 
252. Jonah Goldberg, Column: Scrapping the Electoral College Is a Bad Idea, CHI. 
TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/D4HC-P2GR] (suggesting intentional polarization 
as the driving force behind the NPVIC and that it encourages populist control of a “handful 
of large, highly urbanized states”); see also Curtis Gans, Why National Popular Vote Is a 
Bad Idea, HUFFPOST (updated Mar. 7, 2012), [https://perma.cc/5QMK-HQS9] (suggesting 
the NPVIC will “diminish voter turnout” and warning of the legitimacy challenges to an 
NPVIC election); Chris Stirewalt, The Electoral College Dodges Another Bullet, FOX (Jul. 
6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R2VS-FJ5S] (warning “a national popular election in a nation so 
vast and diverse would be a demagogue’s dream”).  
253. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268. 
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concern was in part mitigated by the geographical distance that 
existed between the electors in each State.254  
The NPVIC brings all the relevant electors/election officials 
into a significantly smaller geographic area and subjects them to 
the “great evil of cabal” associated with direct political 
pressure.255  In addition, the creation of a new election official 
who seemingly has unfettered control to report the election 
results256 likewise may establish cliques among these newly 
founded chief election officials.   
Regarding the competency of presidential candidates, this 
concern has been launched with increasing frequency in modern 
times.257  The NPVIC does not allow any enhanced observation 
or determination of a presidential candidate’s competency other 
than what is presently in place.  Thus, this concern is not better 
addressed after the enactment of the NPVIC.   
Finally, the NPVIC does not address the disenfranchisement 
that is already being alleged under the present election system.258  
While this could be mitigated as an ancillary concern of any 
election system (to be addressed more directly outside of election 
law), at least one alternative to the NPVIC, proposed later, does 
in fact address this concern.   
As a result, the NPVIC, while no better nor much worse than 
the current system in many ways, is almost assuredly not the best 
overall solution.  In addition to these specific and identifiable 
concerns the NPVIC either fails to address or potentially brings 
about, there exist other, more ambiguous sovereignty concerns 
upon the NPVIC’s adoption.  One such concern is that the erosion 
of the distinction between the States reduces the ability to “try 
 
254. Id. at 57, 509.  
255. Id.  
256. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019). 
257. Miles Parks & Mark Katkov, What the 25th Amendment Says about Removing a 
Sitting President, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5LSN-N6TY]; 
Marianna Sotomayor & Mike Memoli, Joe Biden Releases Medical Assessment, Described 
as ‘Healthy, Vigorous’, NBC NEWS, [https://perma.cc/7CY8-QSV2] (Sept. 16, 2021, 2:41 
PM); Jeannie Suk Gersen, We May Need the Twenty-fifth Amendment If Trump Loses, THE 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2020), [https://perma.cc/UT95-4XQ8]. 
258. Block the Vote: Voter Suppression in 2020, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 3, 
2020), [https://perma.cc/SRD4-Z845]; How to Put an End to Voter Disenfranchisement, 
RUTGERS TODAY (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5VP2-N4HR]. 
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novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”259 
Given the general disdain that many Founders held for a 
national popular vote and the potential pitfalls of such a system 
that still exist today,260 there must be a highly persuasive reason 
for the present idea that this system is necessary.  The NPVIC’s 
proponents suggest that something must be done.  Regardless of 
why, their reasons should be addressed thoroughly and 
respectfully.  The section below attempts to provide more 
appropriate alternatives than the NPVIC.  
IV.  WHY DOES THE POPULAR VOTE MOVEMENT 
EXIST AND WHAT ARE SOME ALTERNATIVES? 
It appears that the popular vote is aimed at reconciling the 
disparity between the outcome of an election and the outcome of 
the people’s desire.261  After all, it is a cornerstone in our 
Constitutional Republic that the will of the people is 
controlling.262  Additionally, the motivation of the NPVIC’s 
proponents may also be to broaden the focus of presidential 
campaigning.263  In achieving these goals, it has been proposed 
that the NPVIC is not an attempt to abolish the Electoral College 
writ large.  Instead, it is primarily concerned with eradicating the 
winner-take-all provisions that presently prevail across the 
Nation.264   
 
259. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-80 (1981); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
260. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 
268-69, 284; see also supra Section III.B.2-3.  
261. See Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45 Presidents Came into Office Without Winning 
the National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/3E9R-JVW5] (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2020). 
262. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 405-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
263. How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE 
(Jun. 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZU27-GNXT]. 
264. Michael Gonchar & Nicole Daniels, Is the Electoral College a Problem? Does It 
Need to Be Fixed?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X8W3-HGTE]; see also 
Map of General-Election Campaign Events and TV Ad Spending by 2020 Presidential 
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An advocate of the NPVIC more immersed in the nuances 
might also suggest that it would eliminate the disparity in voting 
power between the citizens of States based on population 
differences (e.g., an occupant of California accounts for one vote 
out of tens of millions in a State that only controls roughly nine 
times the electoral votes of Arkansas, where a citizen accounts for 
one vote among a few million).265  This disparity is further 
exacerbated when comparing more disparate populations.  Under 
this argument the NPVIC would more accurately reflect the one 
person one vote standard. 
These motivations can be inferred from the direct words and 
publications of those that advocate for the NPVIC or similar 
national popular vote programs.266  Regarding the first concern, 
several articles have been published admonishing the Electoral 
College and discussing how the outcome of a particular election 
did not reflect the popular vote when another candidate “won the 
national popular vote by 2,868,518 votes.”267  Finally, regarding 
the broadening of presidential campaigns, the NPVIC’s 
proponents have said sullenly, “[t]he concentration of . . . 
campaign events in just a few battleground states is nothing new 
. . . .”268  It is advocated that the NPVIC will be the solution to all 
these problems and more.  
Now knowing the desires of those who advocate the NPVIC 
specifically, and more generally those that support some form of 
a popular vote, there must be a way to reconcile the Constitution’s 
commands while simultaneously reaching the desires of its 
 
Candidates, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/BE48-GN7Y] (last visited Jan. 4, 
2021) [hereinafter Map of General-Election Campaign Events] (blaming the winner-take-all 
laws for the lack of campaign diversity, among other qualms).  Interestingly enough, the very 
winner-take-all system the NPVIC allegedly loathes would likely be the inevitable outcome 
of the NPVIC, except at a nationwide, rather than a statewide, scale—just a few populous 
States would control the entire presidential outcome as opposed to a few densely populated 
counties. 
265. Distribution of Electoral Votes, THE U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., 
[https://perma.cc/6875-TQ37] (last updated Mar. 6, 2020). 
266. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 15, at 93-94 (“The Humphrey method, however, 
would have modified the exaggerated Electoral College majorities . . . [and] would heighten 
the need for [a] co-ordinated and widely distributed presidential campaign effort on a 
national basis.”); How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, supra note 263. 
267. Nate Silver Calculates that a 3-Million Lead Only Gives Biden a 46%, NAT’L 
POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/7NTG-AGKD] (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). 
268. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264. 
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opposition.  The systems proposed below also try to remedy the 
dangers of keeping the current system.   
A. Ranked Choice Voting 
Ranked-choice voting allows each present individual the 
opportunity to exercise his or her voting rights more than once.269  
This system is very similar to the way Iowa’s presidential DNC 
Caucuses are conducted.270  Because the Iowa caucus system is 
more developed, it will be the foundation for this section, and the 
Ranked Choice Voting System will be briefly discussed toward 
the end.  The political parties of Iowa determine the presidential 
caucus rules of that State.271  In the Iowa system, the voters will 
initially physically divide the room (or attempt to replicate this 
practice through technology) and locate themselves according to 
their desired candidate.272  Then, if that candidate does not receive 
a sufficient percentage of the total votes (ranging from 15-25%), 
that same voter can realign to his or her next most preferred 
candidate.273  This process is then used to select the political 
delegate to elect a primary candidate.274  
Transferring this system to a general presidential election 
would essentially entail the same process.  This process, however, 
is incompatible with the current electoral scheme, which only 
allots one vote per person.275  This is undoubtedly a significant 
obstacle for this proposed election method.  The only potential 
saving grace for this idea is that there is no explicit Constitutional 
mandate requiring one person one vote.276  Instead, the Supreme 
Court has simply interpreted the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments to require this.277  The Court also said 
that this interpretation’s main objective was to ensure “every 
 
269. See IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IOWA DELEGATION SELECTION PLAN 3 (2020).  
270. Compare id., with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 801 (2020).  
271. IOWA CODE § 43.1 (1973). 
272. IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, supra note 269. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 6. 
275. Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
276. See generally U.S. CONST.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal 
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity).  
277. Gary, 372 U.S. at 381. 
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voter is equal to every other voter in his State[.]”278  Thus, if this 
method was universally available to all eligible voters and 
carefully crafted to avoid disparate voting power, there appears to 
be no violation.  This could also be likened to the runoff election 
procedures, which have been deemed to comply with the one 
person one vote mandate.279   
However, it is for this complication alone that this proposed 
system does not present a viable alternative to the Electoral 
College as it stands now.  Nevertheless, it is still a possible and 
popular280 contender to the NPVIC, and thus, States could 
potentially impose new laws in compliance with and recognition 
of this system.  Indeed, many States have already shown a desire 
to radically change the electoral system in their respective 
jurisdictions, as evidenced by the acceptance of the NPVIC and 
its originating legislation.281  
As previously stated, one State has adopted a general 
presidential election model that mirrors the Iowa caucus 
system.282  In Maine, as of November 2020, the candidates for 
president go through several rounds in the selection process.283  
After each round, the candidate with the smallest percentage of 
votes is removed from the running, and the next round begins.284  
This goes on until only two candidates remain, at which point the 
candidate with the most votes wins.285  Each eligible voter 
receives at least five ranks to place the candidates on the ballot 
 
278. Id. at 380. 
279. Minn. Voters All. v. Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Minn. 2009); Dudum v. 
Arntz 640 F.3d 1098, 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing runoffs, even when participation 
was restricted to only a few eligible voters, to prevail in the face of unequal voting power 
claims).  
280. See, e.g., Ranked Choice Voting, YANG2020, [https://perma.cc/866P-9ZLL] (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
281. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 
(2019); D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010). 
282. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801 (2020). 
283. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-
A(2); Timeline of Ranked choice Voting in Maine, FAIR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/9TAV-
L65G] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (Maine’s ranked choice statutory scheme was adopted for 
State general elections in November 2016.  Upon expansion to federal elections in 2018, it 
faced a veto referendum petition, which suspended its implementation until it passed again 
on the November 2020 ballot).  
284.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2). 
285. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2). 
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(this can be expanded, but the minimum is five).286  Despite Rank 
Choice Voting already being unanimously ruled in violation of 
the Maine Constitution—because it violates the one person one 
vote rule expressly mandated within—it has, like a phoenix, or a 
cockroach, remained un-killable.287   
Additional complaints have been launched against Ranked 
Choice Voting Systems, aside from any constitutional complaints 
that could be made.288  These generally attack this system’s 
practical implementation.289  Many point to its implementation in 
the 2020 Iowa Democrat Primary as evidence that this system 
would be doomed from the beginning.290  Indeed, there is strong 
credibility in the argument that the infrastructure necessary for 
this system is far from available, and what we do have seems less 
than capable.  There is also the concern that an election system of 
this nature would all but disenfranchise a voter who did not have 
several hours to devote to an election.291  
Given the aforementioned constitutional attacks a Rank 
Choice Voting System would be subject to, as well as the practical 
drawbacks of such a system, it is difficult to imagine this system 
being able to reach the fundamental goals of any election system.  
It provides no greater access to presidential candidates than the 
current system, with the exception that in the distant future there 
may be more candidates to choose from.  As such, the people’s 
opportunity to meet a candidate may be slightly increased.  Again, 
this interaction would almost assuredly be brief and as 
 
286. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(4). 
287. See Op. of the Justs., 162 A.3d 188, 210-212 (Me. 2017). 
288. See, e.g., Maura Barrett & Ben Popken, How the Iowa Caucus Fell Apart and 
Tarnished the Vote, NBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NL8L-ZDKL]. 
289. See id.; Hollie Russon Gilman, The Democratic Party in Iowa Changes the 
Caucus Rules. There Could be Controversy, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2020), 
[https://perma.cc/456E-FTRR] (“For instance, as my research finds, the wealthier, more 
educated and more able-bodied and -minded residents of Iowa are more likely to persuade 
their fellow caucus-goers.  Furthermore, participating in caucuses requires time and 
resources.  Even getting to the caucus—especially on a cold, snowy February night—can be 
challenging, skewing who shows up.  Particularly excluded are those with disabilities, non-
traditional work schedules and child-care responsibilities.  Moreover, the Iowa caucuses 
have not always appeared to be transparent.”). 
290. Sara Morrison, The Iowa Caucus Smartphone App Disaster, Explained, VOX 
(Feb. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9H76-MATC] (stating that “many precinct chairs didn’t use 
the app at all, citing difficulty downloading or using it”). 
291. Gilman, supra note 289. 
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analytically meaningless as the shaking of hands (or bumping of 
elbows) that occurs presently.  This system is also subject to 
manipulation simply by the inherent complexity.  In that same 
vein, this system’s trust and reliability have already been called 
into question,292 and there has yet to even be a substantial 
implementation of a Rank Choice Voting System. 
 Because of the uniqueness of a Rank Choice Voting System 
and similar election processes, it is difficult to determine how this 
would specifically reach the goals sought by the NPVIC.  That 
being said, thinking in the abstract, it would allow for a varied 
vote, with potentially lesser-known candidates having a larger 
constituency and greater potential to actually secure the 
presidency.  This system would also almost certainly broaden the 
scope of campaigns given its ability to divert attention from the 
two major political parties in the United States.  While there does 
not appear to be any numerical benefit to the voters’ desire 
compared to the election’s outcome, increased representation may 
nonetheless occur.  It would be procured by giving the voters 
more opportunities to elect nuanced candidates and, in turn, 
would require candidates to give more attention to secure States 
if they stand a chance at winning.  The electoral systems in place 
presently would largely remain unchanged (the Electoral College 
slate would still vote for the candidate who won the State’s 
popular vote).293  
As has been previously stated, this hypothetical alternative 
to the NPVIC is highly speculative at best.  The practical impact 
of using an Iowa caucus/Ranked Choice model in the general 
presidential election would be just as unpredictable and possibly 
illegal as the NPVIC.  However, this system has the distinct 
advantage of only requiring States to change their laws 
independently, which can be done according to the State’s powers 
highlighted in Chiafalo.294  Notably this means that no interstate 
compact is required.   
Because of this model’s ambiguity, it may best be retained 
only as a last resort.  The proceeding systems are far more 
 
292. See Barrett & Popken, supra note 288; Morrison, supra note 290; Gilman, supra 
note 289. 
293. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021). 
294. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020). 
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concrete and seemingly reach the same goals as the NPVIC, but 
through legal means. 
B. Proportional Electorate Systems 
There have been several proposals over time that could 
potentially reduce the discrepancy between the outcome of a 
State’s popular vote and the State’s allocation of electoral votes.  
Most of these systems incorporate some kind of proportional 
distribution of a State’s electoral votes based on each district’s 
popular vote.295  This section will specifically discuss the method 
employed by Nebraska as well as a new system coined by Eric T. 
Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball in their article, A More Perfect 
Electoral College: Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions 
Under the Twelfth Amendment.296   
Both of these propositions are defined by their rejection of 
the Winner Takes All (WTA) provision existing across most 
States.297  The WTA system requires all of a State’s Electoral 
College votes to go to the candidate who won a majority of the 
State’s popular vote.298  Instead, the Nebraska system allocates 
each congressional district’s electoral votes to the candidate that 
won the majority of the popular votes in that district.299  Then the 
electoral votes that extend from that State’s senate seats as 
opposed to their district/house of representative seats go to the 
State’s overall winner.300  
This electoral system has been criticized in large part for its 
susceptibility to gerrymandering.301  It is proposed that another 
electoral system, while similar in function, gets around many of 
the deficiencies in the Nebraska system.  This is the system 
developed by Eric T. Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball, called the 
Proportional Election Manner (PEM), where the State’s electoral 
votes are divided based on the percentage each candidate received 
 
295. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29. 
296. Id. at 29. 
297. Id. at 25, 29. 
298. Id. at 20; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021). 
299. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2) (2015). 
300. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2). 
301. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 26. 
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in the State’s popular vote.302  When this results in a fraction of 
the electors, the number of electoral votes is rounded down to the 
nearest whole number, and the winner of the State’s popular 
election overall is awarded the remainder.303   
Both of these systems seek to meet the demands of the 
NPVIC in roughly the same way.  In each process, the WTA 
system is replaced with a proportional vote,304 and thus the 
people’s vote theoretically becomes more influential in 
determining who their electoral representative votes for. 
There is potential in both systems to alter the scope of 
presidential campaigning; however, the scope will not necessarily 
be broadened.  Instead, the focus will simply change from swing 
States to the States that employ these methods.  This can be 
evidenced by Nebraska’s present attention (and Maine’s 
historically, until the recent repulsion of this electoral system).305  
If every State of the Union were to adopt these same methods, the 
outcome would be similar to the NPVIC’s adoption in this regard.  
In other words, a candidate would likely invest campaign 
resources into swing districts or other highly populated areas 
instead of a variety of States.  The States adopting these solutions 
may see an increase in political importance or campaign coverage 
akin to swing States (assuming only a few States adopt these 
methods), but these proposed alternatives do not solve the 
problem of isolated campaign focus.  In addition to meeting the 
concerns the NPVIC seeks to address, these proportional systems 
account for some, but not all, of the underlying goals of any 
election system.  
For starters, they have no mechanism for providing the 
citizens increased interaction with presidential candidates aside 
from potentially broadening the campaign locations.  However, 
 
302. Id. at 29. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 25; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2). 
305. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264 (“The single visit 
to Nebraska and the 2 events to Maine were motivated by the fact that those states award 
electoral votes by congressional district.  Although the statewide result is not in doubt in 
either state, the 2nd congressional district of Nebraska (the Omaha area) and the 2nd 
congressional of Maine (the northern half of the state) were closely divided.  These campaign 
events were held in those particular districts, and the remainder of both states received no 
attention.”).  
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these systems adequately address the trust, reliability, and 
transparency issues to the same extent the present electoral 
system does.  Finally, they seemingly do not increase the risk of 
manipulating the electors or the risk of cliques forming.  It should 
also be noted there is likely a practical bar to the implementation 
of these systems.  That is, the dominant political party in each 
State has no incentive to relieve its State of its control, even 
partially, without the rest of the nation reciprocating the sacrifice.  
For this reason, it is unlikely these systems will slowly be tested 
State to State.  Furthermore, if adopted all at once, the problems 
of overuse would quickly become apparent.   
The systems above more or less maintain the current 
system’s status quo.  The changes they propose are substantial 
and could potentially alter presidential elections to address the 
grievances put forth by the NPVIC’s proponents; however, many 
of these changes would likely lose all effectiveness shortly after 
implementation due to overuse.  In addition, these proportional 
methods fail to stand toe-to-toe with yet another proposed 
method, as seen below.  
C. A Second Look at the Source Material 
Historically, each State’s presidential electors were the only 
names on a presidential ballot, if the people’s input was 
considered at all.306  The elected individuals would then convene 
in their States to select the president on behalf of their 
constituents.307  There was no decree contemplating who they 
were to vote for, nor any other mandatory indication except their 
 
306. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020) (“In some States, 
legislatures chose the electors; in others, ordinary voters did.”); Joel K. Goldstein, Electoral 
College: Is it a Dinosaur that Should be Abolished or a Last Bastion of Democracy?, 20 
UPDATE ON L. RELATED EDUC. 34, 35 (1996); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, 
Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 
906 (2017) (“Early in the nation’s history, the political parties provided ballots to voters to 
cast in the election, and those early presidential ballots simply listed the names of the 
presidential electors pledged to vote for that party’s presidential nominee.”); Rosenthal, 
supra note 240, at 4. 
307. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4 
(“[T]he electors are still chosen on a state-by-state basis, and in turn, they elect the 
President.”). 
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perceptions and beliefs about the candidates.308  Since that time, 
States have continually and gradually reduced the discretion that 
these electors have to cast their ballots.309  This process largely 
began after the election of 1800 when the electors sought to 
disrupt the election of the president by spreading their votes 
between the president and vice president evenly such that the 
decision would be controlled by Congress, which at the time was 
composed of the electors’ favorable political party.310  The 
Twelfth Amendment wholly remedied this problem.311  
Nevertheless, many statutory schemes are presently in place 
to prevent the exercise of discretion by electors.312  This includes 
the WTA system, which directs all electors to vote for the 
candidate who won the statewide popular vote,313 and faithless 
elector statutes, which bar deviation from the result of the 
statewide popular vote.314  The NPVIC is yet another attempt to 
regulate electoral discretion but instead favors the national 
popular vote outcome.315  
While electoral discretion is certainly not perfect, if it were 
to be allowed, as it once was—with the duly elected individuals 
having complete discretion316—it would likely meet many of the 
problems contemplated by the NPVIC, as well as other problems 
the NPVIC fails to address.  For starters, the implementation of a 
 
308. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4 (stating that the 
lack of electoral discretion common today “would have been unrecognizable to the 
Framers”).  But see Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323 (suggesting that upon the advent of political 
parties, the electors of each State were under a strong expectation “to support the party 
nominees”) (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 (1952)); Whittington, supra note 306, 
at 911 (comparing the Electoral College and Presidential Electors Clause to “Chekov’s gun” 
in the sense that it falsely indicates that electors are free to choose when they are in reality 
“instruments for expressing the will of those who selected them”).  
309. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 14. 
310. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2327. 
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (resolving the issue by dictating that if no candidate for 
the presidency received a majority of the votes, “then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of 
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.”). 
312. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 22-23.  
313. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (1969). 
314. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 
18002 (1994). 
315. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013). 
316. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 17.  But see 
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323; Whittington, supra note 306, at 911.  
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direct election of electors rather than a direct election of the 
president would allow for the electors of a person’s State to hold 
a more intimate connection with their constituents and to 
zealously advocate for the issues important to their people on the 
national stage.  This would reduce the number of people vying for 
a candidate’s attention by increasing focus on the chief issues in 
various States.   
Paired with the newfound impossibility of the WTA system, 
electors could make independent and informed value judgments 
about candidates.  In the process, this would also level the 
disparity of power between the single voters in each State.  
Functionally, that power would become indirect.  Electors would 
be free to vote for the candidate they feel is the most 
representative of their constituency after having a personal 
connection with the people, as well as the candidate.  This system 
allows the will of the people of every State to be explicitly heard 
through their liaison.  
Additionally, the votes, occurring at a far more local level 
than state or nationwide scale, will almost certainly be more 
representative of the elector chosen to represent a specific district.  
This proportional representation is precisely what the Nebraska 
and PEM methods seek to accomplish.317  This is because the 
people are voting as a specific district, which gives less of an 
opportunity for a densely populated area to overrule the rest of the 
State or the Nation. 
This system also has the potential to alleviate even the most 
sinister gerrymandering by requiring the independent thought of 
an elector.  No, the elector likely would not sway from his or her 
partisan affiliation, but the elector is at least subject to moral 
accountability.  This system also reduces the incentive to 
gerrymander in the first place.  Even a partisan sweep (occurring 
when every elector is from the same political party) cannot ensure 
a statewide victory for a single candidate, and the majority is no 
longer dispositive of the entire State’s electors. 
Likewise, a presidential candidate’s campaigning will be 
broadened, albeit not geographically, but rather by the specific 
and targeted issues raised by the electors representing the entire 
 
317. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29. 
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United States.  The presidential candidates would no longer have 
to campaign or rally to mass crowds of thousands of people, 
greeting only ten or so before being shuffled away.  Instead, a 
candidate could sit down with 538 people or less throughout a 
campaign, with each person chosen to be the best representative 
of their community’s interests.  Likely to be a televised event, this 
would almost assuredly be more representative of a candidate’s 
actual capacity compared to a candidate addressing a partisan 
crowd chanting their name or waving their flags.  While the 
electoral representative would undoubtedly be as partisan as the 
populations he or she represents, the decreased number of people 
would give the candidate time to address opposing views in an 
actual conversation instead of merely spouting the same rhetoric 
to a different crowd.  
The American people commonly appoint representatives to 
control substantial aspects of their lives, including but not limited 
to a person’s literal life and death.  To think that presidential 
electors should be treated any differently is to ignore the 
foundations of the United States and to laugh in the face of the 
men and women who already see to it that the rights of the people 
reign eternal.  
The potential adoption of this plan, it should also be noted, 
is more likely than any other proposal.  This is because the 
adopting State’s political party does not need to cede its control.  
The electors, now directly chosen by the people, will likely have 
similar, if not the same, partisan affiliations as they did before 
adoption.  The difference is that they are no longer bound in the 
same way they were before.  It is in no way realistic to expect 
members of a political party to uniformly abandon said party, 
except in the most abhorrent of circumstances.  They will likely 
vote along the same partisan lines, but now for the candidate most 
acutely after their own district’s heart.  As a result, there is not the 
same incentive to shy away from this legislation by the dominant 
political party as there is with the other potential electoral 
systems.  Likewise, to those States seeking to avoid the seemingly 
inevitable NPVIC, this system presents a viable alternative.  
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CONCLUSION 
The national popular vote movement and, more specifically, 
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been gaining 
attention.318  It likely will continue to gain attention and support 
in the years following this Comment.  The NPVIC requires 
congressional approval, which it has yet to receive, if it is 
constitutionally permissible.319  However, even if congressional 
approval is tendered, it is unlikely that the compact can be 
sustained.320  The States could challenge the federal government 
and the compact under the notion that the States have a right to 
participate in the federal election process.321  Under the precedent 
set by the Supreme Court in Garcia and other cases, this right is 
evidenced by the structure of the Constitution and the explicit 
federalism concerns stated within.322  This view is also compliant 
with the historical teachings recorded at the Nation’s inception.323  
Additionally, there are practical social and political reasons not to 
implement the NPVIC or a similar election method.324  
Despite the NPVIC’s many faults, the motivation behind it 
is presumptively virtuous.325  As a result, alternative methods to 
reach the same goals have been proposed.326  Two of the proposed 
methods are better suited, right off the bat, for use in the United 
States, given their possible compliance with the Constitution.327  
With a third likely to avoid Constitutional preclusion until it is in 
practice.  However, there are many other differences between the 
alternatives and the NPVIC.   
 
318. Id. at 28. 
319. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 201; see also supra Part II and 
accompanying text. 
320. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text. 
321. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); Alabama v. Arizona, 291 
U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934); see also supra Section III.A. and accompanying text. 
322. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text. 
323. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text. 
324. See supra Section III.B.2. and accompanying text. 
325. See supra Part IV and accompanying text; Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45 
Presidents Came into Office Without Winning the National Popular Vote, supra note 261. 
326. See supra Sections IV.A-C. and accompanying text. 
327. See generally U.S. CONST; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal 
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity); Tollar 
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29. 
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Under the Rank Choice proposal, providing variety in 
campaigning and better representation would be achieved.  That 
being said, this method is undeniably speculative, despite the 
minimal changes to state law that would be required for 
implementation.  Proportional systems, of varying degree and 
kind, all adopt proportional representation of the Electoral 
College’s votes and seemingly meet many of the proposed goals.  
However, they are mainly effective only when used by a few 
States.  In other areas, they merely maintain the system, and all 
its faults, in place today.   
Finally, a return to the original method of presidential 
elections would provide the people the most representation, 
would not require a significant change in existing laws, could be 
implemented effectively throughout the nation, and would secure 
the propriety of elections and the will of the people for centuries 
to come.  If we are to truly accept that some truths are self-evident, 
we should strongly consider an election system that derives from 
the consent of the governed. 
 
 
 
